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ABSTRACT
The rapid development of information and network technologies
motivates the emergence of various new computing paradigms,
such as distributed computing, and edge computing. This also en-
ables more and more network enterprises to provide multiple dif-
ferent services simultaneously. To ensure these services can conve-
niently be accessed only by authorized users, many password and
smart card-based authentication schemes for multi-server architec-
ture have been proposed. In this paper, we review several dynamic
ID-based password authentication schemes for multi-server envi-
ronments. New attacks against four of these schemes are presented,
demonstrating that an adversary can impersonate either legitimate
or fictitious users. The impact of these attacks is the failure to
achieve the main security requirement: authentication. Thus, the
security of the analyzed schemes is proven to be compromised. We
analyze these four dynamic ID-based schemes and discuss the rea-
sons for the success of the new attacks. Additionally, we propose a
new set of design guidelines to prevent such exploitable weaknesses
on dynamic ID-based authentication protocols. Finally, we apply
the proposed guidelines to the analyzed protocols and demonstrate
that violation of these guidelines leads to insecure protocols.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Security protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The security of electronic networks and information systems is a
critical issue for the use of communication technologies, particu-
larly so in e-commerce. Mobile and fixed networks are nowadays
ICNCC 2020, December 18–20, 2020, Tokyo, Japan
© 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-8856-6/20/12.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3447654.3447666
trusted with highly sensitive information. However, a public net-
work such as the Internet should be treated as an insecure network,
where a malicious adversary can eavesdrop, intercept and modify
messages. Thus, cryptographic protocols are required to ensure the
security of both the infrastructure itself and the information that
runs through it [1, 2]. Basic security protocols allow agents to au-
thenticate each other, to establish fresh session keys for confidential
communication and to ensure the authenticity of data and services.
More advanced services like non-repudiation, fairness, electronic
payment and contract signing can be built using these basic security
protocols. The design of such security protocols should be robust
enough to resist attacks [3], [35].
While password-based authentication or other single factor au-
thentication schemes are comparatively simple to implement, they
offer limited security. On the other hand, multi-factor authentica-
tion schemes are more complex to implement, but they provide
superior security [4]. Multi-factor authentication schemes require
participants to present at least two separate authentication factors
from the following categories:
• Knowledge Factors: Participants need to prove knowledge of
a secret, such as a password, passphrase or personal identifi-
cation number (PIN).
• Possession Factors: Participants need to prove possession of a
security token, such as a smart card, dongle or wireless tag.
• Inherence Factors: Factors associated with the participant,
usually based on biometric techniques such as fingerprint
scanning, retina scanning and voice or face recognition.
Many multi-factor authentication schemes that are based on
different authentication factors have been proposed [4–7]. Further,
many applications require protection of the users’ anonymity. This
can be achieved by replacing the true identity of users in any trans-
mission with a dynamic identity [8, 9]. Additionally, as more and
more services are offered online, users are likely to access resources
on multiple servers. If all servers act independently of each other,
then users need to register for each server and they are provided
each time with a different set of credentials (identities, passwords,
possession factors). Consequently, users need to manage their cor-
responding credentials. Thus, in multi-server environments, it is
desirable that users perform a single registration and use a single
set of credentials to access individual servers.
Contribution of this paper. In this paper, we reveal hitherto
unknown weaknesses in the authentication schemes of Liao and
Wang [11], Hsiang and Shih [12], Lee et al. [13] and Li et al. [10]
and we present new attacks that exploit these weaknesses. We
discuss why these new attacks succeed and we propose a new set
of design guidelines to prevent such exploitable weaknesses on
dynamic ID-based authentication protocols.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 discusses related works and review several dynamic ID-based
authentication schemes. In Section 3 we reveal hitherto unknown
weaknesses in the authentication schemes of Liao andWang, Hsiang
and Shih, Lee et al., and Li et al.; and we discuss the new attacks
that exploit these weaknesses. In Section 4 we analyze the security
weaknesses leading to the presented attacks; introduce a new set
of design guidelines to prevent such exploitable weaknesses on
dynamic ID-based authentication protocols and apply the proposed
guidelines to the analyzed protocols. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
In 1981, Lamport [14] formulated a remote password authentication
scheme to be used in an insecure communication environment.
However, as in this scheme servers maintain authentication tokens
in a verification table, it cannot resist an interpolation attack if
an adversary breaks into any server [13]. T. Hwang et al. [15]
proposed a non-interactive password authentication scheme using
smart cards that operates without storing verification tables, but
it does not scale well, as it suffers from a complicated registration
phase and complex password change procedure. M.S. Hwang and
Li [16] proposed a public key-based remote user authentication
scheme using smart cards that also operates without maintaining
verification tables. However, the M.S. Hwang and Li scheme is
vulnerable to attack, where a legitimate, but malicious, user can
impersonate other users [17]. Subsequently, many smart card-based
authentication schemes using one-way hash functions have been
published to improve computational efficiency [18–24].
All these schemes are designed for single server environments.
In 2000, Lee and Chang [25] proposed a user identification and
key distribution scheme for multi-server environments. Numerous
smart card authentication schemes for multi-server environments
have since been published: In 2001 Li et al. [26] proposed a remote
user authentication scheme using neural networks that provides
a single registration to enable access to different servers. How-
ever, Juang [27] observed that the Li et al. protocol provides only
unilateral authentication and does not provide a session key agree-
ment mechanism. Juang also proposed an efficient multi-server
authentication and key agreement scheme based on a hash func-
tion. Chang and Lee [28] demonstrated that the Juang scheme was
vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks and online guessing attacks
if the secret value in the smart card was extracted. To amend the
weakness and reduce the computational cost, they published an im-
proved remote user authentication scheme. Tsaur et al. [29] revealed
that the Chang and Lee protocol was vulnerable to insider attacks,
spoofing attacks and registration centre spoofing attacks. They
proposed an authentication scheme using the RSA cryptosystem
and Lagrange interpolation polynomials for a multi-server envi-
ronment. However, due to its high communication requirements
and computational costs the Tsaur et al. scheme is not suitable for
low-power devices such as smart cards [10]. Furthermore, these
authentication schemes for multi-server environments do not pro-
tect the anonymity of users. They are based on static IDs, where
users employ the same ID to access the remote server in subsequent
connections. In static ID-based schemes, it is easy for an adversary
to trace the source of communications to identify remote users [13].
Consequently, dynamic IDs that change with every connection
request should be used to protect the anonymity of users.
In 2009, Liao and Wang [11] proposed a dynamic ID-based re-
mote user authentication scheme to achieve user anonymity. This
scheme uses hash functions to provide a robust mutual authentica-
tion mechanism for a multi-server environment. Further, Liao and
Wang claimed that the scheme can achieve mutual authentication,
provide two-factor security and guarantee users anonymity.
Hsiang and Shih [12] show that the Liao and Wang scheme
is vulnerable to several attacks, including insider attacks, stolen
smart card attacks, server spoofing and registration centre spoofing
attacks. For example, if an adversary obtains a smart card by mali-
cious means, the stored values can be extracted [30]. This allows
the adversary to impersonate the legitimate owner of the smart
card without knowing the password. Further, this scheme features
poor reparability and fails to provide mutual authentication (due to
calculation errors). To remedy these weaknesses, Hsiang and Shih
proposed an improved version.
Lee et al. [13] demonstrated that the Hsiang and Shih scheme is
vulnerable to several attacks, including masquerading attack and
server spoofing attack. For example, any legal user Ui can imper-
sonate any other legal user Uj to access remote servers without
knowing the secret password of Uj. Further, this scheme also fea-
tures poor reparability and fails to provide mutual authentication
(due to calculation errors). To overcome the identified weaknesses,
Lee et al. proposed a new dynamic ID-based authentication scheme.
Subsequently, Li et al. [10] revealed that the Lee et al. scheme
does not provide authentication and cannot resist forgery attacks
and server spoofing attacks. Furthermore, the personal password
change phase is inefficient, as it requires communicating with the
registration centre via a secure channel. Finally, Li et al. proposed an
improved authentication and key agreement scheme to overcome
the revealed weaknesses.
In the next section, we will demonstrate that the authentication
schemes of Liao and Wang, Hsiang and Shih, Lee et al. and Li
et al. contain further hitherto unknown critical flaws that can be
exploited by an adversary.
3 NEW ATTACKS ON DYNAMIC ID-BASED
PASSWORD AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
The dynamic ID-based password authentication schemes of Liao
andWang [11], Hsiang and Shih [12], Lee et al. [13] and Li et al. [10]
work on the basis that it is not possible to simultaneously guess or
compute the identity IDi and password PWi of user Ui in polynomial
time. Further, they claim that their schemes are secure even if an
attacker can extract values stored in smart cards as discussed in
[30]. In essence, they attempt to achieve mutual authentication by
principals demonstrating their ability to generate secret values.
However, we show that this approach is flawed and we reveal
hitherto unknown weaknesses in these four protocols that can be
exploited by an adversary. As a result of these weaknesses, the
adversary can impersonate other users without knowing either
their IDi or PWi. As authentication is the fundamental goal of these
schemes, they do not achieve their primary objective and, therefore,
should be considered insecure.
79
Detection and Prevention of New Attacks for ID-based Authentication Protocols ICNCC 2020, December 18–20, 2020, Tokyo, Japan





SC Smart Card Reader
IDi Unique identification of user Ui
Wi Unique password of user Ui
SIDj Unique identification of server Sj
DIDi Dynamic identity of user Ui
h(.) A one-way hash function
Krc The master secret key of registration centre
Nb Nonce generated by user Ui at
registration phase
Ni Nonce generated by Ui’s smart card
Nrc, Nr Secret numbers generated by
registration centre
⊕ The exclusive-or operation
|| The concatenation operation
X* Distinguishes received values from stored
values
X’ Distinguishes calculated values from stored
values
XA Value forged by attacker
Our attacks on these schemes require that the adversary can ex-
tract stored values from a smart card. Further, the adversary in these
attacks is either a legitimate user extracting values from his/her
own smart card or an arbitrary entity who extracts values from
a genuine card obtained through theft or other malicious means.
While smart cards are widely considered to be tamper resistant,
many authors of authentication schemes believe such assumption
may be difficult in practice [needs a ref]. Also, the authors of the
authentication schemes discussed in this section claim that their
schemes are secure under the assumption that adversaries can
extract secret information from the smart card [10–13]. Table 1
summarizes the notations used throughout this paper.
3.1 New Attack against Liao and Wang Scheme
In this section, we reveal a new attack against the scheme that
allows an adversary to impersonate a fictitious user to access a
server Sj.
3.1.1 Liao and Wang Scheme. The Liao and Wang scheme has
four phases: Registration, Login, Authentication & Verification, and
Password Change. Initially, the registration centre RC creates Nrc,
Krc and distributes these to all registered servers. In the registration
phase user Ui submits personal password PWi and identity IDi to
RC, who returns a smart card containing (Vi, Bi, Hi, h(.), Nrc), where
Ti = h(IDi || Krc), Vi = Ti ⊕ h(IDi || PWi), Bi = h(PWi) ⊕ h(Krc), Hi =
h(Ti). Login and Authentication & Verification phases authenticate
the user to the server with the following steps, where DIDi= h(PWi)
⊕ h(Ti || Nrc || Ni); Pij = Ti ⊕h(Nrc ||Ni || SIDj); Qi = h(Bi || Nrc ||
Ni); SA = h(Bi || Ni || Nrc || SIDj); UA = h(Bi || Nj || Nrc || SIDj); and
SK = h(Bi || Ni || Nj || Nrc || SIDj):
1. Login Request U->S: (DIDi, Pij, Qi, Ni),
2. Server Acknowledge S->U: (SA, Nj)
3. User Acknowledge U->S: (UA)
4. Message Exchange Using Session Key SK
The password change phase allows users to change their personal
password frequently.
3.1.2 New Attack against Liao and Wang Scheme to Impersonate
Fictitious Users. In addition to the known weaknesses discussed in
section 2, we show that the Liao and Wang scheme suffers from a
hitherto unknownweakness that can be exploited by impersonating
a fictitious user to server Sj. The server is not able to detect that an
illegal request has been made and will accept the login request as a
legitimate.
In this scenario, the adversary is a legitimate user Ua with gen-
uine access credentials from the registration centre RC. The adver-
sary retrieves the secret tokens (Va, Ba, Ha, h(.), Nrc) from his/her
own smart card and obtainsh(Krc) = Ba ⊕ h(PWa). Then the attack
is mounted as follows:
A1. The adversary generates a random nonce NPWi to replace
PWa. Another nonce NTi is generated to replace the value Ta.
The adversary also computes the fictitious value BiA = h(NPW i )
⊕h(Krc)
A2. As per the protocol description, the adversary generates
nonce Ni and uses the obtained values to compute:
DID = h(PWi) ⊕h(Ti || Nrc || Ni) = h(NPWi) ⊕ h(NTi || Nrc || Ni)
Pij = Ti⊕h(Nrc || Ni ||SIDj) = NTi ⊕h(Nrc ||Ni || SIDj)
Qi = h(Bi || Nrc|| Ni) = h(BiA || Nrc || Ni)
Subsequently, the adversary sends counterfeit login request
DIDi, Pij,Qi, to service provider Sj.
A3. Sj attempts to validate the request by computing:
Ti = Pij ⊕h(Nrc ||Ni || SIDj) = NTi
The server Sj is unable to detect that Ti = NT i rather than Ti =
h(IDi || Krc) and Sj calculates:
H(PWi)=DIDi’⊕h(Ti || Nrc || Ni)= h(NPWi); Bi= h(PWi) ⊕h(Krc)
= h(NPWi) ⊕h(Krc) = BiA ; and
Qi’ = h(Bi || Nrc || Ni) = h(BiA || Nrc || Ni)
The calculated value Qi’ is compared with the received Qi* from
the login request. As these match, Sj accepts the login request and
computes SA = h(BiA || Nrc || Ni || SIDj).
A4. The adversary accepts the server acknowledgement message,
computes the user acknowledge message:
UA = h(BiA || Nj || Nrc || SIDj), and sends UA to Sj.
A5. Sj computes UA’ = h(BiA || Nj || Nrc || SIDj), and compares
it with the received UA. As these are equal, Sj authenticates the
adversary as a legitimate user, even though counterfeit credentials
were used. The adversary can now start a session with Sj using the
session key SK = h(BiA || Ni || Nj || Nrc || SIDj).
In this attack, the adversary can use random access credentials
to impersonate a fictitious identity to the server without knowing
either legitimate IDi or PWi. The root cause of the attack is that
the adversary is capable of obtaining RC’s secret h(Krc) and then
uses this secret to forge the essential value BiA = h(NPW i ) ⊕h(Krc)
during the protocol session. This forged value BiA enables the
creation of values DIDi and Qi. Meanwhile, the server only verifies
that the same Bi component is used in the values DIDi and Qi.
Hence, the server is unable to detect that fictitious credentials have
been used, and it will accept the adversary’s login request.
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3.2 New Attack against Hsiang and Shih
Scheme
In this section, we demonstrate that the Hsiang and Shih scheme
suffers from a hitherto unknown weakness that an adversary can
exploit to impersonate a fictitious user to access a server Sj.
3.2.1 Hsiang and Shih Scheme. The Hsiang and Shih scheme has
the same four phases as the Liao and Wang scheme. Initially, the
registration centre RC creates Nrc, Krc and distributes h(SIDj ||
Nrc) to all registered servers. In the registration phase user Ui
submits secret password h(Nb⊕PWi) and identity IDi to RC, who
returns smart card containing (Vi, Bi, Hi, Ri, h(.)), where Ti = h(IDi
|| Krc); Vi = Ti ⊕ h(IDi || h(Nb⊕PWi)); Bi = Ai⊕ h(Nb⊕PWi); Ri =
h(h(Nb⊕PWi) || Nr); Hi= h(Ti); and Ai= h(h(Nb⊕PWi) || Nr) ⊕h(Krc
|| Nr). The user Ui enters Nb into the smart card and the Login and
Authentication & Verification phases authenticate the user to the
server with the following steps, where DIDi = h(Nb⊕PWi) ⊕h(Ti
|| Ai || Ni); Pij = Ti ⊕h(Ai || Ni || SIDj); Qi = h(Bi || Ai || Ni); Di =
Ri⊕SIDj ⊕Ni; Co = h(Ai || Ni+1 || SIDj); Mjr = h(SIDj || Nrc) ⊕Njr;
C1 = h(Njr || h(SIDj || Nrc) || Nrj); C2 = Ai ⊕h(h(SIDj || Nrc) ⊕Njr);
SA = h(Bi || Ni || Ai || SIDj); UA = h(Bi || Nj || Ai || SIDj); and SK =
h(Bi || Ai || Ni || Nj || SIDj).
1. Login Request U->S: (DIDi, Pij, Qi, Di, Co, Ni)
2. Login Server S->RC: (Mjr, SIDj, Di, Co, Ni)
3. RC Acknowledge RC->S: (C1, C2, Nrj)
4. Server Acknowledge S->U: (SA, Nj)
5. User Acknowledge U->S: (UA)
6. Message Exchange Using Session Key SK
The password change phase allows users to change their personal
password.
3.2.2 New Attack against Hsiang and Shih Scheme to Impersonate
Fictitious Users. In addition to the known weaknesses discussed
in section 2, we show that the Hsiang and Shih scheme suffers
from the hitherto unknown weakness that can be exploited by
impersonating a fictitious user to server Sj. The server is not able
to detect that an illegal request has been made and will accept the
login request as a legitimate.
In this scenario, the adversary is a legitimate user Ua with gen-
uine access credentials from the registration centre RC. The ad-
versary retrieves the secret tokens (Va, Ba, Ha, Ra, Nba, h(.)) from
his/her own smart card and obtains h(Krc ⊕ Nr ) = Ba ⊕ h(Nba ⊕
PWa) ⊕ Ra. Then the attack is mounted as follows:
A1. The adversary generates the random nonces: NRi to replace
Ri; NSPWi to replace h(Nb⊕PWi); and NTi to replace Ti. Also, the
adversary computes the fictitious values: AAi = NRi ⊕ h(Krc ⊕Nr)
and BAi = AAi ⊕ NSPWi.
A2. The adversary generates the nonce Ni and uses the obtained
values to compute:
DIDi = h(Nb⊕PWi) ⊕ h(Ti || Ai || Ni) = NSPWi ⊕ h(NTi || AAi ||
Ni)
Pij = Ti ⊕h(Ai || Ni || SIDj) = NTi ⊕h(AAi || Ni || SIDj)
Qi = h(Bi || Ai || Ni) = Qi = h(BAi || AAi || Ni)
Di = Ri⊕SIDj ⊕Ni = NRi⊕SIDj ⊕Ni
Co = h(Ai || Ni+1 || SIDj) = h(AAi || Ni+1 || SIDj)
Subsequently, the adversary sends counterfeit login request
(DIDi, Pij, Qi, Di, Co, Ni) to service provider Sj.
A3. Sj generates nonce Njr, computes Mjr = h(SIDj || Nrc) ⊕Njr
and sends (Mjr, SIDj, Di, Co, Ni) to the registration centre RC.
A4. RC performs the following calculations:
Njr =Mjr ⊕h(SIDj || Nrc); Ri = Di⊕SIDj⊕Ni = NRi;
Ai = Ri⊕h(Krc⊕Nr) = NRi ⊕h(Krc⊕Nr) = AAi ; and C’o = h(Ai ||
Ni+1 || SIDj) = h(AAi || Ni+1 || SIDj)
The calculated value Co is compared with the received value Co*.
As these match, RC accepts Sj as the legitimate server requested
by the user. RC then generates nonce Nrj and computes:
C1 = h(Njr || h(SIDj || Nrc) || Nrj) and C2 = Ai ⊕h(h(SIDj || Nrc)
⊕Njr)= AAi ⊕h(h(SIDj || Nrc) ⊕Njr)
Finally, RC sends the RC Acknowledge Message (C1, C2, Nrj) to
Sj.
A5. Sj computes C1’ = h(Njr || h(SIDj || Nrc) || Nrj) and compares
it with the received C1*. As they are equal, Sj authenticates RC and
computes:
Ai = C2 ⊕ h(h(SIDj || Nrc) ⊕Njr) = AAi; Ti = Pij ⊕h(Ai || Ni ||
SIDj) = NTi;
h(Nb⊕PWi) = DIDi ⊕ h(Ti || Ai || Ni) = NSPWi; Bi = Ai ⊕
h(Nb⊕PWi) = AAi⊕ NSPWi = BAi;
Qi’ = h(Bi || Ai || Ni) = h(BAi || AAi || Ni).
The calculated value Qi’ is compared with the received Qi* from
the user login request message. As these are equal, Sj generates
nonce Nj, computes SA = h (Bi || Ni || Ai || SIDj) and sends (SA, Nj)
back to the user.
A6. The adversary accepts the server acknowledgement message,
computes the user acknowledge message UA = h (BAi || Nj || AAi ||
SIDj) and sends UA to Sj.
A7. Sj computes UA’ = h (BAi || Nj || AAi || SIDj) and compares
it with the received UA*. As these are equal, Sj authenticates the
adversary as a legitimate user, even though counterfeit credentials
were used. The adversary can now start a session with Sj using the
session key SK = h(BAi || AAi || Ni || Nj || SIDj).
In line with the attack on the Liao and Wang scheme, the adver-
sary can use random access credentials to impersonate a fictitious
identity to the server without knowing either legitimate IDi or PWi.
The root cause of the attack is that the adversary can obtain RC’s
secret h(Krc ⊕ Nr ) and uses this secret (together with random val-
ues NRi, NSPWi, NTi) to forge the essential values AAi, BAi during
the protocol session. Meanwhile, RC will only establish whether
the values Ai, Di use the same component Ri . This is achieved by
retrieving Ri from the received Di , using the retrieved Ri value to
compute values of Ai, Co’ and comparing the computed Co’ with
the received value Co*. As these values match, RC is unable to de-
tect that fictitious credentials have been used. RC will send the RC
Acknowledge Message, which contains the forged AAi, to server
Sj. As the server only verifies that the Login Request and the RC
Acknowledge Message contain the same Ai , it is unable to detect
that fictitious credentials have been used and will accept the bogus
login request.
3.3 New Attacks against Lee et al. Scheme
In this section, we show that the Lee et al. scheme suffers from
a hitherto unknown weakness that an adversary can exploit to
impersonate a fictitious user to access a server Sj.
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3.3.1 Lee et al. Scheme. The Lee et al scheme has the same four
phases as the Liao and Wang scheme. Initially, the registration
centre RC creates Nrc, Krc and distributes h(Nrc), h (Krc || Nrc)
to all registered servers. In the registration phase user Ui submits
secret password h(Nb⊕PWi) and identity IDi to RC, who returns
smart card containing (Vi, Bi, Hi, h(.), h(Nrc)), where Ti = h(IDi ||
Krc), Vi= Ti ⊕ h(IDi || h(Nb⊕PWi)), Bi= h(h(Nb⊕PWi) ||h(Krc||Nrc))
and Hi = h(Ti). On receipt of the smart card, Ui also stores Nb in
the smart card. The Login and Authentication & Verification phases
authenticate the user to the server with the following steps, where
DIDi = h(Nb⊕PWi) ⊕ h(Ti || Ai || Ni); Pij = Ti ⊕h(h(Nrc) ||Ni || SIDj);
Qi = h(Bi || Ai || Ni); SA = h(Bi || Ni || Ai || SIDj); UA = h(Bi || Nj || Ai
|| SIDj); Ai = h(Ti || h(Nrc) || Ni); and SK = h(Bi || Ni || Nj || Ai || SIDj):
1. Login Request U->S: (DIDi, Pij, Qi, Ni)
2. Server Acknowledge S->U: (SA, Nj)
3. User Acknowledge U->S: (UA)
4. Message Exchange Using Session Key SK
The password change phase allows users to change their personal
password.
3.3.2 New Attack against Lee et al. Scheme to Impersonate Fictitious
Users. In addition to the known weaknesses discussed in section
2, the Lee et al. scheme has an unknown weakness that can be
exploited by an adversary to impersonate a fictitious user to access
a server Sj. The server is not able to detect that an illegal request
has been made and will accept the login request as a legitimate
request.
In this scenario, the adversary is a legitimate user Ua with gen-
uine access credentials from the registration centre RC. The adver-
sary retrieves the secret tokens (Va, Ba, Ha, Ra, Nba, h(.), h(Nrc))
from his/her own smart card. Then the attack is mounted as follows:
A1. The adversary generates the random nonce NTi to replace
original value Ti and uses the original values PWa, Nba and Ba
associated with the legitimate account Ua. It is worth noting that
PWa, Nba and Ba do not depend on the adversary’s real identity IDa
(PWi and Nb can be changed by users at any time) and therefore,
these cannot be used to reliably identify user Ua.
A2. As per protocol description, the adversary generates nonce
Ni and uses the obtained values to compute:
AAi = h(Ti || h(Nrc) || Ni) = h(NTi || h(Nrc) || Ni); DIDi =
h(Nb⊕PWi) ⊕ h(Ti || Ai || Ni) = h(Nba ⊕ PWa) ⊕ h(NTi || AAi ||
Ni); Pij = Ti ⊕h(h(Nrc) ||Ni || SIDj) = NTi ⊕ h(h(Nrc) ||Ni || SIDj);
and Qi = h(Bi || Ai || Ni) = Qi = h(Ba || AAi || Ni)
Subsequently, the adversary sends the counterfeit login request
(DIDi, Pij, Qi, Ni) to the service provider Sj.
A3. Sj attempts to validate the request and computes: Ti = Pij
⊕h(h(Nrc) || Ni || SIDj) = NTi
The server Sj is unable to detect that Ti = NTi rather than Ti =
h(IDi || Krc). Thus, Sj uses this value to calculate: Ai = h(Ti || h(Nrc)
|| Ni) = h(NTi || h(Nrc) || Ni); h(Nb⊕PWi) = DIDi ⊕ h(Ti || Ai || Ni) =
h(Nba ⊕ PWa); Bi = h(h(Nb⊕PWi) ||h(Krc || Nrc)) = h(h(Nba⊕PWa)
||h(Krc || Nrc)) = Ba; and Qi’ = h(Bi || Ai || Ni) = h(Ba|| Ai || Ni). The
calculated value Qi’ is compared with the received Qi* from the
user login request. As these match, Sj accepts the login request,
computes SA = h (Bi || Ni || Ai || SIDj), and sends (SA, Nj).
A4. The adversary accepts the server acknowledgement message,
computes the user acknowledge message UA = h (Ba|| Nj || Ai|| SIDj)
and sends UA to Sj.
A5. Sj computes UA’ = h(Ba|| Nj || Ai || SIDj) and compares it with
the received UA*. As these are equal, Sj authenticates the adversary
as a legitimate user, even though counterfeit credentials were used.
The adversary can now start a session with Sj using the session key
SK = h(Ba || Ni || Nj || Ai || SIDj).
In this attack, the adversary can use random access credentials
to impersonate a fictitious identity to the server without knowing
either legitimate IDi or PWi. The root cause of the attack is that this
scheme misses dependencies in secrets: Values Ti, PWi, Nbi and Bi
are the main components the server employs to authenticate users.
However, there is no dependency between Ti (the user’s secrete ID)
and the other values. Thus, the adversary Ua can replace Ti with
a random value NTi and use it together with original values PWa,
Nba and Ba associated with the legitimate account Ua to forge the
login credentials. As neither of PWa, Nba and Ba is linked to the
identity of the user account, the use of a random Ti value cannot
be detected.
3.4 New Attacks against Li et al. Scheme
In this section, we show that the Li et al. scheme suffers from two
hitherto unknown weaknesses can be exploited to access a server Sj
without knowing IDi and PWi .We present an attack in section 3.4.2
where the adversary exploits a weakness to impersonate a fictitious
user. In section 3.4.3, we present another new attack, where an
adversary can use a stolen smart card to impersonate the owner of
the stolen smart card.
3.4.1 Li et al. Scheme. The Li et al. scheme has the same four
phases as the Liao and Wang scheme
Initially, the registration centre RC creates Nrc, Krc and dis-
tributes h(Krc || Nrc) and h(SIDj || Nrc) to all registered servers.
In the registration phase user Ui submits secret password Ai =
h(Nb⊕PWi) and identity IDi to RC, who returns smart card con-
taining (Ci, Di, Ei, h(.), h(Nrc)), where Bi = h(IDi || Krc), Ci = h(IDi
|| h(Nrc) || Ai), Di = h(Bi || h(Krc || Nrc)) and Ei = Bi⊕ h(Krc || Nrc).
On receipt of the smart card, Ui also stores Nb in the smart card.
The Login and Authentication & Verification phases authenticate
the user to the server with the following steps, where DIDi = Ai
⊕ h(Di || SIDj || Ni); Pij = Ei ⊕h(h(SIDj || h(Nrc)) ||Ni ); M1 = h(Pij ||
DIDi || Di || Ni);
M2 =h(SIDj|| h(Nrc)) ⊕Ni; M3 = h(Di || Ai || Nj || SIDj); M4 =Ai
⊕Ni⊕Nj; UA = h(Di || Ai || Ni || SIDj); and
SK = h(Di||Ai|| Ni || Nj || SIDj):
1. Login Request U->S: (DIDi, Pij, M1, M2)
2. Server Acknowledge S->U: (M3, M4)
3. User Acknowledge U->S: (UA)
4. Message Exchange Using Session Key SK
The password change phase allows users to change their personal
password.
3.4.2 New Attack against Li et al. Scheme to Impersonate Fictitious
Users. In this scenario, the adversary has obtained a smart card
through malicious means and retrieves the secret values (Ci, Di,
Ei, Nb, h(.), h(Nrc)), from the stolen smart card. Then the attack is
mounted as follows:
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A1. The adversary generates the nonce NAi to replace original
token Ai and uses the retrieved tokens Di, and Ei associated with
the legitimate owner of the smart card.
A2. As per protocol description, the adversary generates nonce
Ni and uses the obtained values to compute:
DIDi = Ai ⊕ h(Di || SIDj || Ni) = NAi ⊕ h(Di || SIDj || Ni); Pij = Ei
⊕h(h(SIDj || h(Nrc)) ||Ni );
M1 = h (Pij || DIDi || Di || Ni); and M2 =h (SIDj|| h(Nrc)) ⊕Ni.
Subsequently, the adversary sends counterfeit login request
(DIDi, Pij, M1, M2) to service provider Sj.
A3. Sj attempts to validate the request and computes:
Ni = M2 ⊕h (SIDj|| h(Nrc)); Ei = Pij ⊕h(h(SIDj || h(Nrc)) ||Ni ); Bi
= Ei⊕ h(Krc || Nrc);
Di = h(Bi || h(Krc || Nrc)); Ai = DIDi ⊕ h(Di || SIDj || Ni) = NAi ;
and M1’ = h(Pij || DIDi || Di || Ni).
The calculated valueM1’ is compared with the receivedM1* from
the login request. As these are equal, Sj accepts the login request,
generates nonce Nj and computes the server acknowledgement
message (M3, M4): M3 = h (Di || Ai || Nj || SIDj) = h (Di || NAi || Nj ||
SIDj); and M4 =Ai ⊕Ni⊕Nj = NAi ⊕Ni⊕Nj. Sj responds with (M3,
M4) to the adversary.
A4. The adversary accepts the server acknowledgement message
and computes:
UA= h(Di || Ai || Ni || SIDj)= h(Di || NAi || Ni || SIDj). The adversary
send UA to Sj.
A5. Sj computes UA’ = h(Di || NAi || Ni || SIDj)) and compares
it with the received UA*. As these are equal, Sj authenticates the
adversary as a legitimate user, even though counterfeit credentials
were used. The adversary can now start a session with Sj using
session key SK = h(Di || Ai || Ni || Nj || SIDj).
In this attack, the adversary can use random access credentials
to impersonate a fictitious identity to the server without knowing
either legitimate IDi or PWi. The root cause of the attack is that
this scheme misses dependencies in secrets: Values Ai, Bi and Di
are the main components the server employs to authenticate users.
However, there is no dependency between Ai and the other values.
Thus, the adversary Ua can replace Ai with a random value NAi and
use it together with original values Bi and Di associated with the
victim’s account Ui to forge the login credentials. As the secret Ai
is not linked to the identity of the user account, the use of a random
Ai value cannot be detected. In summary, the adversary can use
forged credentials to gain access to server Sj. Note: If the server Sj
keeps detailed records of the session, Sj can contact the registration
centre and use either the value Di or Ei to track down the owner
Ui of the stolen smart card (both of which have Bi as a component,
which in turn contains IDi). However, the attack cannot be traced
back to the adversary.
3.4.3 New Attack against Li et al. Scheme to Impersonate Owner of
a Stolen Smart Card. In this attack, an adversary can fool a service
provider Sj to authenticate the adversary as the legitimate owner
Ui of the smart card, even though the adversary does not know
the corresponding personal password PWi. In this scenario, the
adversary has obtained the smart card of user Ui through malicious
means.
The adversary retrieves the secret values (Ci, Di, Ei, Nb, h(.),
h(Nrc)) from the stolen smart card. Further, the attacker requires a
record of a login request message (DIDik, Pik, M1k, M2k) from the
legitimate owner Ui of the smart card to any service provider Sk.
Then the attack is mounted as follows:
A1. The adversary retrieves Ai from the recorded login message
by computing:
Nik = M2k ⊕h(SIDk|| h(Nrc)); and Ai = DIDik ⊕ h(Di || SIDk ||
Nik).
A2. As per protocol description, the adversary generates nonce
Ni and uses the obtained values to compute:
Pij = Ei ⊕h(h(SIDj || h(Nrc)) ||Ni ); DIDi = Ai ⊕ h(Di || SIDj || Ni)
= NAi ⊕ h(Di || SIDj || Ni);
M1 = h (Pij || DIDi || Di || Ni); and M2 =h(SIDj|| h(Nrc)) ⊕Ni.
With these values, the adversary can now construct the coun-
terfeit login request message (DIDi, Pij, M1, M2), which is sent to
service provider Sj. The remainder of this attack follows the original
protocol specification.
The targeted service provider Sj is unable to detect that the login
message is counterfeit and will authenticate the adversary as user
Ui. After the verification phase has finished, the adversary can
communicate with Sj using session key SK=h (Di||Ai||Ni||Nj|| SIDj).
In this attack, the adversary can impersonate an owner of any
stolen smart card to access servers without knowing either legiti-
mate IDi or PWi. The root cause of this attack is that an attacker
can extract usable tokens from a stolen smart card. These tokens
can then be used to retrieve the value Ai from a previously recorded
message. Thus, the adversary has all required components to au-
thenticate as user Ui to any server Sj.




The new attacks presented in the previous section demonstrate that
none of the examined schemes can guaranteemutual authentication,
as an adversary can forge an apparently valid login request. The
authentication schemes of Liao and Wang, Hsiang and Shih, Lee et
al. and Li et al., all use a dynamic identity (value DIDi) to protect the
user anonymity during the session with server Sj. As information
can be extracted from smart cards [30], a user password PWi is
used to provide two-factor security. The authors claim that their
schemes are secure, as long as only the password or the smart card,
but not both, are obtained by an adversary [10–13]. Further, the
design requirements of these schemes state that no verification
or password tables should be maintained in the servers. Thus, the
basic steps for authentication in these schemes are:
• Users calculate authentication tokens based on users’ pass-
word, their real identity and information stored in the smart
card.
• Servers verify the users’ authentication tokens by comparing
them against re-computed values obtained from the com-
ponents received from users and system-wide information
obtained from the registration centre during the server reg-
istration phase.
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Thus, Sj essentially establishes whether the values received from
Ui are consistent with the values sent from a user who has regis-
tered with the registration centre RC. However, no attempt is made
to establish whether the user is in fact registered with RC.
4.1 Investigation Results
Investigating the structure of the communication messages in all
the discussed authentication schemes reveals that all these schemes
fail to fulfil the following required conditions:
• C1. Non-disclosure of Registration Centre secrets: If an adver-
sary can learn Registration Centre secrets, the adversary can
obviously use these to create forged credentials that a server
cannot distinguish from legitimate credentials. Registration
Centre secrets include values such as Krc, h(Krc), h(Krc⊕Nr).
• C2. Sufficient dependencies between user-submitted values:
Servers use components received from the user to re-
compute authentication tokens. If there are insufficient de-
pendencies between these user-submitted values, then an
adversary that is also a legitimate user might be able to use
a combination of random values and values obtained from
the legitimate smart card to forge authentication tokens.
• C3. Inability of unauthorized parties to retrieve usable tokens
from smart cards: All authentication schemes discussed in
this paper assume that an attacker can retrieve values from a
smart card that has been obtained by malicious means. Thus,
it is important to store authentication tokens in a protected
manner that prevents an unauthorized party to use these
values in a bogus authentication request.
In authentication schemes were condition C1 is violated, the
adversary first retrieves secret RC information from a smart card
and then uses the retrieved information to forge suitable credentials
to impersonate a fictitious user. As the forged credentials are created
using bona fide RC secrets, servers are not able to detect the forgery
and will accept the forged credentials. For example, consider the
attack on the Liao and Wang scheme detailed in Section 3.1.2. The
adversary, which is a legitimate user of the system, uses his/her
password PWi to retrieve h(Krc) = Bi ⊕h(PWi) from the smart
card. Subsequently, the attacker uses two random values NTi and
NPW i . The former, NTi is used to replace Ti and NPW i is used in
conjunction with the retrieved h(Krc) to calculate a fictitious Bi.
These values are then used to forge a request to server Sj, who is not
able to detect the request as being illegitimate. Thus, the leakage
of RC’s secret h(Krc) leads to the fictitious user attack, where an
adversary can impersonate a fictitious user to gain access to server.
Authentication schemes that violate condition C2, allow attack-
ers to use a combination of random values together with legitimate
user components. If there are insufficient interdependencies be-
tween these values, then servers are not able to detect that the
random values are not related to the legitimate components and
they might accept bogus authentication requests. For example, con-
sider the attack against the Lee et al. scheme outlined in Section
3.3.2. The adversary is a legitimate user Ua that attempts to au-
thenticate as a fictitious user. The adversary replaces the value Ti
with a random value NTi and uses the original values PWa, Nba
and Ba associated with the legitimate account Ua. As there are no
dependencies between Ti and PWi, Nbi, Bi, the computations per-
formed by server Sj all yield the expected result. Thus, Sj is not able
to detect that token NTi is a counterfeit value, rather than value
h(IDi || Krc), that corresponds to the received values derived from
PWa, Nba and Ba. Therefore, the server accepts the counterfeit
authentication request as a legitimate request.
If an authentication scheme violates condition C3, then the at-
tacker can directly use values from a smart card that has been
obtained by malicious means to mount the attack. For example,
consider again the attack against the Li et al. scheme outlined in
Section 3.4.2. In addition to violate condition C2 (sufficient depen-
dencies between user-submitted values) it also violates condition
C3: The adversary is able to retrieve values Di, Ei from the smart car
(as these are stored in an unprotected manner) and can use these
values in the attack. As these values are legal values created by RC,
severs are unable to detect that they are used by an unauthorized
entity.
In summary, the new attacks revealed in this paper succeed, as
servers do not possess sufficient knowledge about users’ access
credentials. Servers re-compute these credentials based on received
values and secrets shared with the registration centre and compare
the computed values with the received values. If they match, servers
assume successful authentication. In cases where the conditions C1
and C2 are not met, adversaries can construct suitable credentials
based on secret values extracted from the smart card and random
values that servers cannot distinguish from genuine credentials.
4.2 Design Guidelines for Attack Prevention
In this section, we propose a set of design guidelines for dynamic
ID-based remote user authentication schemes in multi-server envi-
ronments in order to prevent the weaknesses revealed during our
investigation.
• DG1. No passwords exposure: The user’s password should not
be revealed to any principals, servers or the registration cen-
tre. If the user’s password is revealed during registration or
authentication, any administrator of the server/registration
centre could use the identity and password to impersonate
users.
• DG2. Efficient password procedures: The authentication
scheme should feature efficient and convenient procedures
for users to select and update their personal passwords. Fur-
ther, the authentication mechanism should provide an effi-
cient solution for dealing with incorrect passwords. In gen-
eral, this can be achieved by implementing authentication
as close to the user as possible, e.g. if a smart card is used,
the user should be authenticated locally by the smart card
without interaction with any server.
• DG3. Safeguarding of RC secrets: Implementation of this en-
hancement requires identification of all RC secrets used to
compute tokens that are stored in smart cards or used in the
login and verification phase and then ensuring that these
secrets cannot be utilized by users to forge tokens.
• DG4. Ensuring sufficient interdependencies between authen-
tication tokens: Authentication tokens submitted by users
in the login request require sufficient interdependencies to
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Table 2: Empirical results of proposed design guidelines
Analyzed Protocol Violated
guidelines
The root cause of the attack
Liao and Wang Scheme DG3, DG5 Adversary can obtain the secret of RC: h(Krc).
Hsiang and Shih Scheme DG3, DG5 Adversary can obtain the secret of RC: h(Krc ⊕ Nr ).
Li et al. Scheme DG4 The scheme misses dependencies in secrets.
Li et al. Scheme DG4, DG5 The scheme misses dependencies in secrets and the adversary can extract usable tokens
from a stolen smart card.
ensure that the attackers cannot mix legitimate tokens with
random values or other counterfeit tokens.
• DG5. Protected stored authentication tokens: If a possession
factor such as a smart card is used, then any authentica-
tion tokens stored in the smart card should be stored in a
protected manner that prevents extraction of usable tokens
by unauthorized entities. As has been demonstrated in this
work, if servers authenticate users only based on informa-
tion directly stored in a smart card, then an adversary can
retrieve these tokens from a maliciously obtained smart card
to impersonate users.
• DG6. Multi-factor authentication: Authentication should be
based upon at least two factors of the following categories
1) knowledge factors; 2) possession factors; and 3) inherence
factors. For example, a password is a knowledge factor and a
smart card is a possession factor. In such a scenario, a strong
password should be used to authenticate the legitimate user
to the smart card. On successful user authentication, the
smart card will initiate a mutual authentication process with
a server.
• DG7. Mutual authentication: Mutual authentication should
be achieved between the user and the corresponding remote
systems/server. The user can authenticate the identity of the
server and the server can verify the identity of the user.
• DG8. Session key agreement: A session key should be estab-
lished between user and server, once mutual authentication
has been achieved. Any subsequent communication is en-
crypted with this session key, which provides confidentiality
and secrecy of the transmitted data. In any further sessions a
new key needs to be established. Both server and user need
to be able to verify freshness of the agreed session key.
• DG9. Forward secrecy: Forward secrecy indicates that if the
master secret key of any server is compromised, the secrecy
of any previously established session keys should not be
affected.
• DG10. User anonymity: User anonymity ensures that an
eavesdropper cannot identify which user is involved in a
communication with a server. Consequently, an adversary
cannot analyze the activities being performed by a specific
user.
• DG11. Possession factor revocation: If a possession factor (e.g.
a smart card) is lost, users need the ability to revoke this
possession factor. Thus, the system needs to provide a mech-
anism to invalidate a possession factor that ensures that it
will not be accepted in any future authentication processes,
even if an attacker should obtain all required authentica-
tion factors (e.g. an attacker may learn the users password
through social engineering).
• DG12. Resistance to attacks: A secure protocol design needs
to be resistant against various attacks such as forgery attacks
[33]; replay attacks [3, 36]; stolen smart card attacks [10];
parallel session attacks [3, 31, 32]; stolen-verifier attack [34],
insider attack [12, 37] and denial-of-service [9, 38].
4.3 Application of Proposed Guidelines
The conformance of the four discussed schemes [10–13] is estab-
lished by examining their compliance with the twelve above pro-
posed guidelines. The results of this evaluation are summarized
in Table 2. The second column of this table indicates the violated
design guidelines, while the third column presents the root cause of
the attack discovered on each scheme. This study shows that for all
the schemes evaluated with new discovered attacks violate at least
one of the guidelines. Hence, the application of the proposed guide-
lines shows how non-conformance with these guidelines causes
the protocols to be attackable.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, four dynamic ID-based password authentication
schemes for multi-server environments were reviewed. Further,
several hitherto unknown attacks against these schemes were re-
vealed. The presented new attacks ascertain that these protocols
fail to achieve mutual authentication and it was demonstrated how
an adversary can impersonate either a fictitious or a legitimate user
to any server. These attacks are possible, as the servers re-compute
authentication tokens based on received values and secrets shared
with the registration centre. By crafting suitable counterfeit cre-
dentials based on secret values extracted from the smart card, an
adversary can trick a server to accept these counterfeit credentials.
We investigated the weaknesses exploitable by the discussed dy-
namic ID-based authentication schemes and established the reasons
for the success of the new attacks. Furthermore, we proposed a new
set of design guidelines to prevent such exploitable weaknesses on
dynamic ID-based remote user authentication schemes in multi-
server environments and we demonstrated how non-conformance
with these guidelines causes the analyzed protocols to be attackable.
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